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A CALL TO LEADERSHIP: THE FUTURE OF RACE
RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA
Rodney A. Smolla *
I. A CALL TO LEADERSHIP
Let us answer a call to leadership.
Let us answer a summons to build a new future for race relations
in this Commonwealth.
There is no more fitting commemoration of the decision fifty
years ago in Brown v. Board of Education1 than a renewed com-
mitment today to ensure that the next fifty years will be years of
progress and prosperity.
I am optimistic about the future of race relations in Virginia.
Mine is a focused optimism, however, tempered by the sober under-
standing that the promise of the future will be achieved only with
seriousness of purpose, bipartisan collaboration, and creative en-
ergy. We are capable of that purpose, that collaboration, and that
energy. We draw strength from deep reservoirs: from our long-
standing commitment to the rule of law, from our legacy of enlight-
ened and inspirational political, legal, and business leadership, and
from the essential abiding generosity and goodwill of our people.
The time has come to put these strengths to the service of a
higher purpose.
The time has come to organize, to energize, to communicate, to
work through conflict and to seek common ground for the common
good.
* Dean and George E. Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.
B.A., 1975, Yale University; J.D., 1978, Duke University.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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The history of race relations in Virginia is in many respects em-
blematic of the history of race across America. It is a history inex-
tricably bound up in the history of western culture. Consider the
march.
II. THE MARCH TO EQUALITY
A. The Ancients
Aristotle wrote with brilliant insight about essential attributes
of justice and about the ideals of equality and balance in fashion-
ing the rules of law.2 Yet Aristotle lived in and defended a society
built upon a brutal slavery.3
B. All Men are Created Equal
Influenced in large part by the wisdom and insights of the an-
cients, future readers of Aristotle in the new world would write
powerfully about the basic rights of man. Virginia's Thomas Jef-
ferson wrote, in words that still stir our souls: "We hold these
Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights . .."' Yet Jefferson owned slaves at Monticello.5
C. The Constitution and Slavery
After a courageous victory in the war of independence, our na-
tional leaders, many of them sons of Virginia, would forge the
2. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: BOOKS III AND IV 58-60 (Richard Robinson trans., Clar-
endon Press 1995).
3. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: BOOKS I AND II 5-7 (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Claren-
don Press 1995).
It is clear that those constitutions which seek the common advantage are cor-
rect and accord with simple right, while those which seek only the advantage
of the rulers are all mistaken and perversions of the correct constitutions. For
the latter are all masterships, whereas the city is a society of the free.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 21.
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
5. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situ-
ational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 129, 312 (2003).
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Constitution and Bill of Rights,' our nation's greatest contribu-
tion to world history, creating a brilliant system of checks and
balances, and enshrining in a written text our profound commit-
ment to the protection of the basic rights of humankind. Yet that
magnificent Constitution was in one awful respect deeply flawed,
for it embraced the institution of slavery, prohibiting any end to
slavery for a score of years,' and cynically counting slaves for rep-
resentation purposes as three-fifths of a man.8
D. John Marshall and Marbury
John Marshall, who as a young man fought with valor in the
American Revolution,9 settled down after the war to practice law
in Richmond, and would have been entirely happy to make the
private practice of law his peaceful and contented life.1" He was
summoned to leadership by George Washington, John Adams,
and others in the generation of his father, and though with some
reluctance, answered that call to leadership, serving his nation as
a diplomat, cabinet officer, and ultimately, as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States.1 As Chief Justice, our
greatest Virginia jurist altered the course of American history, in-
fusing into the concept of the "rule of law" a new resonance. In his
historic decision in Marbury v. Madison,2 John Marshall forever
altered the American conception of the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, of law, of the role of judges, and of the role of lawyers. Insist-
ing that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,"'3 John Marshall entrenched
in our constitutional tradition the elemental notion that the Su-
preme Court could strike down a law passed by the legislature if
6. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & STEWART BURNS, A PEOPLE'S CHARTER: THE
PURSUIT OF RIGHTS IN AMERICA 56-61 (1991) (detailing Virginian James Madison's role in
the proposal and passage of the Bill of Rights); CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN
COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 54-
55 (1986) (listing the Virginians at the Constitutional Convention as James Madison,
George Washington, George Mason, George Wythe, John Blair, Edmund Randolph, and
James McClurg).
7. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.
8. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
9. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 37-69 (1996).
10. See id. at 144-68.
11. Id. at 184-85, 265-67, 278-79.
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. Id. at 177.
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that law conflicted with the Constitution, the supreme law of the
land.14
E. Dred Scott
Yet once again, whatever promise lay in Marbury for the possi-
bility of racial liberty would wait many generations for its con-
summation. Without Marbury there could have been no Brown.
But even with Marbury, Brown was a long time coming. What
would come first would be Dred Scott v. Sandford,5 in which,
with bitter irony, the Supreme Court would for the first time
truly flex the legal muscle that had been developed in Marbury,
yet flexing that muscle not to promote liberty, but to quash it. It
was in Dred Scott that the Supreme Court held that in the very
nature of things it could not be that our Constitution contem-
plated the possibility that an African slave or an African slave's
American descendants could ever be citizens, could ever be mem-
bers of the polity, for they were regarded as "beings of an inferior
order."'6
14. Id. at 178.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the consti-
tution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to
the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of
these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial
duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is supe-
rior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordi-
nary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Id.
15. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
16. Id. at 404-11.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an infe-
rior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in so-
cial or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and
lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and
treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit
could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the
civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as
well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open
to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitu-
ally acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public
concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.
Id. at 407.
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F. Emancipation and the Civil War Amendments
In the wake of Dred Scott our nation was plunged into a bloody
civil war, with Richmond the capital of the Confederacy. Abra-
ham Lincoln would issue his Emancipation Proclamation, would
address the soul of the nation at Gettysburg, and would die at the
hands of an assassin. Yet the war did end, and with it slavery,
and the Constitution was re-constituted, with the addition of the
great civil war amendments: the Thirteenth Amendment abolish-
ing slavery, 7 the Fifteenth Amendment declaring that the right
to vote shall not be abridged on account of race,"8 and most impor-
tantly, the Fourteenth Amendment, placing into our law the fun-
damental principle of equality and declaring in simple but ringing
terms that no state shall deprive any person of "the equal protec-
tion of the laws."'9 Yet again, the lifting potential of these great
changes in our law was not matched by a concomitant change in
our attitudes or our practices. Despite Lincoln, despite the war,
despite the Fourteenth Amendment, neither true freedom nor
true equality was yet ready to grow. Instead we grew Jim Crow.
G. Jim Crow, the Civil Rights Cases, and Plessy
Jim Crow laws planted the seeds of racial hate and racial sepa-
ration in virtually all aspects of American life.2" When Jim Crow
laws were challenged in the Supreme Court, in landmark deci-
sions such as the Civil Rights Cases2 and Plessy v. Ferguson,22
the Court would approve of this legally-sanctioned segregation. In
the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court held that the guaran-
tee of equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment did not
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.").
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
20. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 116 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). "[L]aws
from the Jim Crow era created 'an atmosphere in which ... private white individuals
could justify their bias and prejudice against blacks .... ' Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri,
593 F. Supp. 1485, 1503 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
21. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
22. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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prohibit private acts of discrimination.23 The Court took a simi-
larly restrictive view of the meaning of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, holding that it was intended primarily to abolish slavery,
and not provide for any regime of general cultural or social equal-
ity.24 One of the dominant motifs of the Civil Rights Cases was
thus the theme that the civil war amendments were designed to
protect the legal rights of African Americans, but simply had
nothing to do about social rights, and were not intended to make
the races like each other, or have any significant associations
with one another.25 These themes were picked up and magnified
with vengeance in Plessy, in which the Court quoted:
"[ilt would be running the slavery argument into the ground ... to
make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see
fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he
will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or thea-
ter, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.
"26
The message the Court had for Homer Plessy was that white is
white and black is black, and never the twain shall meet.27
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white
and colored races-a distinction which is founded in the color of the
two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are
distinguished from the other race by color-has no tendency to de-
stroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of in-
voluntary servitude.
28
The Court saw its doctrine of separate but equal as almost a law
of the universe, something that existed "in the nature of things.929
23. 109 U.S. at 10-11. The Civil Rights Cases established the "state action doctrine,"
which remains to this day a cornerstone of American constitutional law. Id. at 11. In de-
fending the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a law that sought to ban discrimination in many of
the private spheres of society, such as inns and transportation, the government claimed
that Congress had authority to pass the legislation pursuant to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 9-10. The Supreme Court rejected this
proposition. Id. at 18-19. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reasoned, could not be
invoked to support legislation barring discrimination by private actors, as opposed to gov-
ernmental entities. Id. at 11-14. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court asserted, was
aimed only at guaranteeing "the equal protection of the laws" in matters concerning the
laws and actions of the state itself, not private individuals or businesses. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at 20-25.
25. See id. at 24-25.
26. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25).
27. Id. at 543.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 544.
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In what was the most devastating passage in the Plessy opinion,
the Court thus declared:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the abso-
lute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of
things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equal-
ity, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to
either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in
places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not neces-
sarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other .... 30
Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases were a terrible setback for
the march of equality. At a crucial juncture in American history,
in which the country was poised to launch a new era of freedom
and equality, the Supreme Court failed us in leadership, instead
giving its imprimatur to racial hatred and separation.
III. THE PROPHETIC VOICE OF JUSTICE HARLAN
One courageous Supreme Court Justice, John Marshall Harlan,
rose in counterpoint to the Supreme Court's failures in the Civil
Rights Cases and Plessy.3' In one of the most famous dissenting
opinions in the history of American law, Justice Harlan in Plessy
spoke directly to the conscience of his fellow Justices, and to the
American people.
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and
in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it re-
mains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class
of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of
civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the
peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes
no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is, there-
fore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the
fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is
30. Id.
31. See 109 U.S. af 26-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552-64 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
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competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their
civil rights solely upon the basis of race. 32
Justice Harlan insisted that the destinies of blacks and whites
in America are indissolubly linked together, and that laws sanc-
tioning separation could only sow seeds of race-hate.
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to
be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the
Dred Scott case. It was adjudged in that case that the descendants of
Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves
were not included nor intended to be included under the word "citi-
zens" in the Constitution, and could not claim any of the rights and
privileges which that instrument provided for and secured to citizens
of the United States; that at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion they were "considered as a subordinate and inferior class of be-
ings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had
no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the
government might choose to grant them." The recent amendments of
the Constitution, it was supposed, had eradicated these principles
from our institutions. But it seems that we have yet, in some of the
States, a dominant race-a superior class of citizens, which assumes
to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all citizens, upon
the basis of race. The present decision, it may well be apprehended,
will not only stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritat-
ing, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will encourage
the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat
the beneficent purposes which the people of the United States had in
view when they adopted the recent amendments of the Constitution,
by one of which the blacks of this country were made citizens of the
United States and of the States in which they respectively reside,
and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the States are for-
bidden to abridge. Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the
presence here of eight millions of blacks. The destinies of the two
races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the in-
terests of both require that the common government of all shall not
permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law.
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly cre-
ate and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than
state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored
citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to
sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will ad-
mit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisi-
ana.
33
32. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 559-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dred Scot v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
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Justice Harlan thus spoke the truth to a people in denial. His
opinion was at once prophetic and apocalyptic. The darkest im-
pulses of humanity at its worst had infected the American char-
acter. The nation would never prosper until it had rid itself of this
disease. Speaking to the heart of the country, Justice Harlan ad-
monished that a regime of racial degradation was contrary to our
national boasts of democracy and freedom. The myth of separate
but equal was but a thin disguise.
We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other
peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of
the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degra-
dation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before
the law. The thin disguise of "equal" accommodations for passen-
gers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for
the wrong this day done.34
IV. THE BROWN DECISIONS
A. The Great Victory in Brown I
If racial supremacy and separation won the battle in Plessy,
they did not ultimately win the war. Justice Harlan's prophecy
would one day be fulfilled. Through the courage and indomitable
will of many great Americans, including the extraordinary contri-
butions of many great Virginians, the regime of Plessy v. Fergu-
son was finally brought down in 1954 with Brown v. Board of
Education ("Brown T').35 The Supreme Court in Brown I repudi-
ated Plessy and its doctrine of separate but equal,36 and set in mo-
tion yet another American revolution.
B. Brown II and All Deliberate Slowness
Once again, however, the wheel took a full turn forward and a
half turn back. In Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown I/') 37 the
How.) 393, 404-05 (1856)).
34. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown 1").
36. Id. at 495.
37. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown IF').
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Supreme Court diluted the moral force of its ruling in Brown I by
announcing that the desegregation of American schools should
not take place immediately, but rather with all deliberate speed.3
This would be used as cover throughout the country for a regime
of massive resistance, a regime that could boast Richmond as its
intellectual capital-the same city that was once the capital of
the Confederacy. All deliberate speed would become all deliberate
slowness.39
Yet the wheel did not stop turning. There were enlightened
leaders in Richmond, and around the state and nation. Lewis
Powell and Oliver Hill in Richmond would forge an alliance.4" The
Supreme Court would jettison all deliberate speed and insist on
the dismantling of the system of segregated schools now, a dis-
mantling that was to be thorough and unremitting, "root and
branch."4
V. NEW STRUGGLES
New struggles would emerge. The simple moral injunctions
that discrimination and separation were wrong and no longer to
be tolerated would give way to the more difficult and complicated
moral and legal struggle over remedies such as affirmative action.
Virginia would again play a pivotal historic role. In City of Rich-
38. Id. at 301 ("IThe cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceed-
ings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and
proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate
speed the parties to these cases.").
39. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
DCSS' initial response to the mandate of Brown II was an all too familiar
one. Interpreting 'all deliberate speed' as giving latitude to delay steps to de-
segregate, DCSS took no positive action toward desegregation until the 1966-
1967 school year, when it did nothing more than adopt a freedom of choice
transfer plan. Some black students chose to attend former de jure white
schools, but the plan had no significant effect on the former de jure black
schools.
Id. at 472.
40. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 158-59 (1994) (detailing
Powell and Hill's relationship during the desegregation of the Richmond school district).
41. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). The Court held that
adoption of a freedom of choice plan does not, by itself, satisfy a school district's manda-
tory responsibility to eliminate all vestiges of a dual system. Id. at 440. Green was a turn-
ing point in the law, in which the Court stated that "'[t]he time for mere 'deliberate speed'
has run out."' Id. at 438 (quoting Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)).
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mond v. J.A. Croson Co.,42 arising from an affirmative action plan
adopted by the city of Richmond, the Supreme Court would strike
down mechanical quota-style forms of affirmative action.43 In
counter-balance to Croson, however, was the decision in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke." Justice Lewis Powell,
who had led the Richmond School Board,41 would craft the influ-
ential swing opinion in Bakke, the first landmark affirmative ac-
tion decision in the context of university education.46 Powell's
opinion would finally be endorsed by a majority of the Supreme
Court decades later in its historic rulings in the University of
Michigan cases, Grutter v. Bollinger' and Gratz v. Bollinger.48
42. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
43. Id. at 486, 499-506.
44. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
45. Powell was appointed to the Richmond School Board in 1950 and served as chair-
man from 1952-60. See JEFFRIES, supra note 40, at 124, 131-82.
46. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269.
47. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In a case with dramatic implications for American society and
equal protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court upheld in Grutter, by a 5-4 vote, a rul-
ing by the Sixth Circuit that the University of Michigan Law School's use of race in admis-
sions to obtain the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body was consti-
tutional under application of the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 334. A majority of Justices
endorsed the view that the pursuit of student body diversity is a compelling state interest
that may justify using race in university admissions. Id. at 327-43. At the same time,
however, the Justices rejected as unconstitutional a university's attempt to enroll a "criti-
cal mass" of minority students merely to assure the presence of some specified percentage
of a racial or ethnic group. Id. at 335-37. The Court held, nonetheless, that a narrowly tai-
lored admissions program ("flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity
in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same
footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight") is
constitutional. Id. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317). The touchstone, the Court held,
was that the program ensures that each applicant is evaluated as an individual, and that
race or ethnicity not be the defining feature of the evaluation of the application. Id. at 337.
48. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). In a companion to Grutter, the Court in Gratz held that the
University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts' use of racial prefer-
ences in undergraduate admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 250-51. Michigan's undergraduate admissions system used a selection
method, in which every applicant from an "under represented" racial or ethnic minority
group was automatically awarded twenty points of the 100 needed to guarantee admis-
sion. Id. at 255. The Court held that an admissions policy such as Michigan's, that in its
view considered race exclusively, was unconstitutional. Id. at 275-76. Michigan's twenty
point distribution system, the Court reasoned, "ha[d] the effect of making 'the factor of
race.., decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority appli-
cant." Id. at 272 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
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VI. LET US CONSTRUCT A FUTURE HISTORY
Our task in this state and throughout the nation, when it
comes to race, is to construct a future history. To construct that
future history, what our state and our nation need today is lead-
ership. We need leadership at our universities, in our courts, in
our professions, in our businesses, in our political and civic insti-
tutions. We need leaders who are not afraid to lead.
Inspired leadership is not the exclusive province of any race,
any political party, or of any ideological view. We treat with equal
admiration the magnificent qualities of leadership exhibited by
Americans as diverse as Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Martin Lu-
ther King, and Ronald Wilson Reagan. Such giants may have had
different political agendas or different views on specific matters of
public policy, but they shared many core values and defining
qualities and we will do well never to stop learning from them.
I believe in leaders who are not afraid. Franklin Roosevelt was
not, warning us that we have nothing to fear but fear itself.
Ronald Reagan was not, with his indefatigable optimism.
I believe in leaders who are not afraid to dream. Martin Luther
King was not.
I believe in leaders with the courage and inspiration to appeal
to the best sides of our nature.
I believe in leaders with the creativity and doggedness to help
the community conceive a vision, build consensus behind it, and
carry out its execution.
Reform begins at home. We must treat as a sacred obligation
the task of assisting our city, our state, our legal profession, and
our nation, to devise creative and constructive solutions to the
challenges that face us all. As Justice Harlan prophesized, our
destinies are indissolubly linked together.49 For us to prosper to-
gether we must invest in education, invest in our system of jus-
tice, and invest in the infrastructure that serves our human capi-
tal. Our task is to ensure that a reflection on the sixtieth or sev-
enty-fifth anniversary of Brown will describe a better history
than the fiftieth anniversary, just as the fiftieth is better than
that painted on the twenty-fifth.
49. See supra Part III.
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As lawyers, as Richmonders, as citizens of Virginia, we may be
justly proud of the profound contributions that many from our
Commonwealth have played in the struggle for racial justice. The
history has not always been admirable. For each turn of the
wheel forward there have been half turns and sometimes full
turns back, but on the whole the wheel has moved us toward the
ideal of a racially tolerant and just society.
We must rededicate ourselves to that goal.
Each in our own way, according to our own political and spiri-
tual lights, must seek to break down the barriers that divide and
build the bridges that unite.

